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Category/Department:  General
Published:  Tuesday, February 23, 1988
In an article published on Feb. 22, New York Times correspondent Alan Riding comments on
the failure of Brazil's moratorium gamble to change the rules of Third World debt management
strategy. Last year, when Brasilia suspended payments on a large portion of its $113 billion foreign
debt, officials believed that the moratorium would serve as a means to obtain improved debt
payment and financing conditions for Third World debtor nations. Brazil's gamble did not result
in appreciable benefits for anyone. By December 1987, it was clear Brasilia had reverted to a more
conventional approach (i.e., endless debt restructurings), and recently Brazil announced its "return
of the International Monetary Fund" as overseer of the nation's economic policy. Riding asks why
did Brazil decide once again to dedicate nearly all its trade surplus to debt service rather than to
domestic spending? According to Finance Minister Mailson Ferreira da Nobrega, the moratorium
was a mistake because the losses it provoked were heavier than the potential gains. In brief, Brazil's
"radical policy" led to reductions in foreign investment and credit flows. While creditors, including
the IMF, World Bank and the Reagan administration are celebrating the defeat of so-called "radical
tactics" to the Third World debt crisis, Riding calls attention to the fact that no new mechanisms
for stable debt management have been created since 1982. Brazil has only rejoined other debtor
nations in a "futile attempt to rebuild their economies while keeping up debt payments." The author
states that perhaps the only significant development since the regional crisis began is that many
US and European banks have increased reserves against losses, and thus reduced vulnerability to
temporary interest payment suspension and even defaults. Major banks have continued lending
to Latin American governments, if only to enable them to make interest payments. The focus of
commercial lending, however, has switched to Asia. Riding argues that Brazil overestimated its
bargaining power last year. Instead of attempting to offer conciliatory terms for Brazil, commercial
and government creditors instead retaliated by cutting trade credit lines and delaying other loans.
Some Brazilian officials estimate Brazil's loss during the moratorium at $1 billion. In the same vein,
Riding claims that the timing of Brazil's action could have been better. In 1986 Brasilia would have
had a better chance since at that time the economy was growing, foreign reserves were adequate,
and President Jose Sarney was popular. By February 1987, however, escalating inflation was
undermining confidence in the government and the economy, and domestic support for Brazil's
"radical" debt strategy had disappeared. Next, although other Latin American governments were
hoping to benefit from the Brazilian initiative, the Sarney administration did not attempt to mobilize
other major debtors to participate in a coordinated regional action. Riding points out that major
banks have effectively formed creditors' cartels via their so-called advisory committees which
carry out successive debt restructurings. As of yet, they have not been obligated to confront a
debtors' cartel. Riding suggests that since 1984, with the formation of the Cartagena Group by 11
Latin American debtor nations, the region's major debtors have had a forum in which they could
have coordinated joint actions. Since 1984, the Cartagena Group has issued statements calling
for reduced interest rates, resumption of credit flows and reduced protectionism to expand their
export markets. Cartagena nations have never discussed coordinating a joint default, default threat,
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or other "get tough" maneuvers that might follow from a debtors cartel. Riding suggests that a
principal reason for the absence of coordinated actions on the part of Latin America's major debtors
is the fact that their financial crises did not coincide. The author enumerates the following scenarios
as evidence of his argument. * In 1984, Argentina challenged both its creditors and the IMF. Brazil
and Mexico discouraged Argentina from defaulting, as they apparently believed their own crises
were winding down. * In 1985, Peru unilaterally limited its debt payments to 10% of its export
earnings, and has since been ostracized in the international financial community. Lima received
no support from Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. * In 1986, when low oil prices on the world market
threatened Mexico's economic development prospects, Mexico City came close to suspending debt
service payments. Brazil and Argentina were reportedly optimistic about their new stabilization
programs and offered no support to Mexico. * In 1987, when Brazil declared its moratorium,
Mexico and Argentina had just completed new agreements with creditors. They preferred to watch
Brazil's situation from the sidelines. Further, Riding points out that foreign banks through their
advisory committees have also skilfully managed to assure that negotiations with Brazil, Mexico
and Argentina do not coincide. This year it appears that the "lack of coincidence" of economic crisis
conditions among the big three debtors no longer holds. For the first time since 1982, Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico are all suffering the effects of high inflation, minimim or stagnant growth, rising
unemployment and weak governments to be replaced in the near future.
-- End --
